

USF-I Commander's Weekly Assessment

Mr. Secretary, this week we transferred the Camp Cropper Theater Internment Facility (TIF), the last U.S. detention facility, to the Iraqi Ministry of Justice (MoJ). This transfer follows the closing of Camp Bucca in 2009 and the transfer of the Taji detention facility earlier this year. We have been working for 19 months to transition detention operations, having safely and securely released or transferred 24,000 detainees to the Iraqi government in accordance with the Security Agreement. The MoJ's readiness to manage these facilities has steadily improved through a comprehensive program we have implemented to increase their capabilities. We currently have plans in place to monitor, mentor, advise and train the MoJ to sustain detention facilities and the populations within them effectively and humanely. We will also maintain a small capability in Camp Cropper to hold around 225 detainees until the end of 2011.

On Sunday, al Qaida in Iraq (AQI) conducted 2 separate attacks against the Sons of Iraq (Sols). This is clearly an attempt to prove their resiliency and strike at the will of the Sol. We will take special care to reassure all Sol leaders of our continued support and reinforce with the Iraqi government their responsibility to the Sol program. Security remains stable, but we are beginning to see an uneasiness among the people due to the delay in government formation. There is intelligence stating that Promised Day Brigade (PDB), Jaysh Rajal al Tariqah al Naqshbandi (JRTN) and others are beginning to exploit this uneasiness.

b(6) and I continued to meet with all of the key Iraqi leaders this week regarding government formation negotiations. When we met with Prime Minister (PM) Maliki on Thursday, we had a frank discussion with him, explaining that he currently has little support from any of the other 3 major blocs. Therefore, it could be difficult to retain the premiership without their support. Maliki continues to insist that only he can lead Iraq toward continued progress. He was also adamant that, if he had to give up his post, it would not be to Allawi. Allawi also continues to claim that he would not allow Maliki or any other member of Da'wa to become PM. Despite this, Maliki and Allawi have agreed to meet this evening (19 July) to continue their ongoing discussions.

As part of his maneuvering to stay in power, PM Maliki reportedly sent State of Law (SoL) delegates with Sadrists to Tehran to gain support from Muqtada al Sadr for a Maliki premiership. There are various rumors regarding the extent of the proposed deal. The Sadrists are now apparently willing to support Maliki as PM in exchange for important government posts, such as Deputy PM, Minister of Interior or several service ministries, along with the release of all Sadrist detainees. It is unclear what, if anything, Maliki has accepted. However, there may be room for compromise with the Sadrists. In a meeting I had with President Talabani on Sunday night, he informed me that he had good news: the Sadrists have now agreed to support Maliki. In order for any Maliki-Sadrist alliance to work, it would require full support from the Kurds. I do not believe that Masoud Barzani would accept a major Sadrist presence in the agreement.

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With the passing of the 14 July constitutional deadline for electing a Council of Representatives (CoR) Speaker, United Nations Assistance Mission – Iraq (UNAMI) Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) Melkert believes the international community now has reason to be more proactive in its involvement with government formation. SRSG Melkert stated he intends to use his 04 August report to the UN Security Council as a reason to convene the four major political blocs to gain their views on what he should report. Given the commitment to form a national unity government, SRSG Melkert believes that all four blocs should work together from the beginning to shape what such a government would look like in terms of powers and political programs. He expects, however, that SoL may be reluctant to participate. There remain concerns that PM Maliki is not behaving as if he is presiding over a caretaker government. Some are also worried about PM Maliki's undemocratic tendencies, particularly regarding his use of extra-constitutional security apparatuses. While I have similar concerns regarding PM Maliki's actions, we have not seen any specific, overly worrisome behavior as of yet. Chris and I continue to make it clear that we support a unity government representative of all parties, that the U.S. remains committed to the process, and that it is time to move forward.

Security: Security incidents this week decreased to 141, below the 12-week average of 152. Improvised explosive device (IED), indirect fire (IDF) and high profile attacks (HPAs) also fell, with HPAs declining from 8 to 2. Total killed and injured are 43 and 129 respectively, down from 52 and 280 last week.

Though the 7th Imam pilgrimage has ended, we are continuing to assess potential threats to upcoming religious celebrations. Shabaniyah, honoring the 12th Imam's birth, is celebrated annually by Shi'a Muslims, with Karbala serving as the central location for the festival. Between 1 and 4 million pilgrims are expected to visit the holy shrines in Karbala during the festivities, which will reach their peak around 26 July. Large Shi'a gatherings are also expected at Iraq's other preeminent Shi'a shrines located in Najaf and Baghdad. Historic attacks during Shabaniyah have targeted Shi'a pilgrims moving through Babil province toward Karbala. This trend may continue in 2010. To counter this threat, the Mid-Euphrates Operations Command (MEOC), led by LTG Uthman, issued orders on 03 July directing security operations in support of Shabaniyah and will brief the Minister of Defense on the security plan today. Additionally, LTG Othman has conducted several coordination meetings with the Karbala provincial leadership and Iraqi and U.S. forces to ensure the plan's success. These preparations are indicators of the ISF's increased sophistication in the planning and conduct of complex, synchronized operations. We will continue to support the ISF throughout the planning, preparation and execution of security operations to protect this important religious festival.

Meanwhile, we and our Iraqi partners continued to sustain pressure on key leaders and associates within AQI. On 13 July, U.S. and Iraqi forces captured the AQI Northern Baghdad Belt Emir. His exploitation may degrade AQI capabilities in this

area and disrupt suicide VBIED and IED attack planning. In a partnered counter-terrorism operation in Baghdad on 15 July, Iraqi and U.S. personnel also detained [] a close associate and brother-in-law to AQI senior leader Abu Du'a, who may provide targetable information regarding the location of Abu Du'a and other senior AQI leaders.

This week, I chaired a meeting of the High Level Committee (HLC) on Security to discuss current Arab-Kurd security issues and the way forward to integrate Kurdish and Iraqi security forces. Attendees included the Iraqi Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior, the KRG Interior Minister and Minister for Peshmerga Affairs, and representatives from the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the Embassy and UNAMI. During the meeting, Iraqi and Kurdish ministers were able to agree on the elimination of 18 unilateral checkpoints (UCPs), 12 in Ninawa and 6 in Diyala. I told the committee that our goal is the elimination of all UCPs and emphasized that future UCP reductions are the key to increased faith in the tri-lateral security forces and continued progress on Arab-Kurd political issues. We also discussed the equipping and training plan for the KRG Regional Guard Brigades and Zerevani police forces. The way ahead must include the transition of tri-lateral checkpoints to a combined Iraqi Army / Peshmerga force under joint command and control. We must solve this problem by the summer of 2011.

The Minister of Defense and I chaired the sixth Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee (JMOCC) at the Iraqi Ministry of Defense on 15 July to evaluate our progress in implementing the Security Agreement (SA). The Defense Minister expressed his pleasure in the successful implementation of the SA and complimented U.S. forces in their disposal of leftover U.S. military materiel. We provided a complete laydown of U.S. force posture post - 01 September and described in detail the missions and support we will continue to provide. It was very well received and succeeded in reducing anxiety and eliminating any misperceptions of the post-September U.S. commitment. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Defense Minister recommended that another meeting, with the PM's participation, occur before 31 August to celebrate the change of mission and continued evolution of the strong partnership between USF-I and the ISF.

On 17 July, [] and I convened the semi-annual Senior Leader Forum designed to provide an assessment of the supporting goals and sub-goals of the Joint Campaign Plan (JCP). We accomplished two major objectives: a candid discussion of our progress on JCP execution; and a capstone review of products for presentation at CENTCOM's Iraq Transition Senior Leader Conference in Washington next week. [] and I were both pleased with the outcome of the forum and look forward to the discussions with interagency senior leaders at the conference.

We experienced no combat or non-combat deaths for the second week in a row. In July to date, we have had 0 killed in action and 3 non-combat deaths.

Economics and Energy: This week, the Ministry of Electricity (MoE) presented an investment workshop to attract foreign investment in the electricity sector. Topics included investment laws applicable to foreign investors, plans for generating investment, and a review of various investment options available in the electricity sector. Acting Minister of Electricity Shahrastani also discussed different types of investments for building, owning and operating power plants. The MoE is seeking to increase electricity production to

12,000 MW during the next three years, and has developed a plan to present to investors for implementing projects in support of this objective. The workshop also outlined procedures associated with being an Independent Power Producer (IPP). Under an IPP agreement, a private investor funds construction, engineering, procurement and construction costs, and manages the plant for a set period after construction, while the MoE guarantees land lease, inputs, and pricing for the electricity upon completion of the facility. Though the conference was well attended, the level of investor confidence is difficult to ascertain given recent changes at the MoE and uncertainties regarding fuel supplies. The true results of the conference will not be known until the MoE receives actual bids from interested companies, due in September, with winning proposals selected in November. Soon after the conference, Shahrastani announced that 8 new power stations will be built under an IPP agreement at sites across southern Iraq. The privatization of Iraq's electricity sector is critical to improving the country's electricity infrastructure, increasing the electrical supply to the population and supporting continued economic growth. This positive step was driven by significant political pressure on the PM. How the government implements the plan will be the true test.

Rule of Law: The formal turnover of the Camp Cropper TIF to the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) was completed on Thursday. With the TIF, USF-I transferred 1,443 detainees to Iraqi authorities, while we will retain custody of 203 detainees at the request of the Iraqi government in Compounds V and VII of the camp. Along with housing this enduring population, Compounds V and VII will have an additional 20 bed spaces to hold detainees resulting from partnered counter-terrorism operations. In preparation for the transfer, Iraqi correction officers have been working with U.S. forces for many months now and have had sufficient formal and on-the-job training to successfully continue to provide care and custody in accordance with internationally recognized standards. Additionally, USF-I will continue its transferred detainee monitoring mechanism, enabling us to sustain situational awareness of key high-value detainees in Iraqi custody.

Transition and Responsible Drawdown: This week, the Iraqi government signed an agreement with the U.S. for the training of 10 selectively-chosen Iraqi Air Force pilots, with training projected to begin this fall in the U.S. Upon graduation, these pilots will have completed all flight training necessary to move immediately into F-16 flight training. The Iraqi government is currently working to fund the \$8.6 million required for the program. This agreement is the most significant commitment to date by the Ministry of Defense for an F-16 program that will prove to be a key element of an enduring U.S.-Iraq strategic partnership.

NATO Assistant Secretary General (ASG) Martin Howard completed a two-day visit to Iraq this week, focusing on a future long-term relationship between NATO and Iraq. ASG Howard met with the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior and National Security Advisor, reiterating two common themes in each engagement: extending the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) beyond 2011; and developing a long-term agreement between Iraq and NATO. All three Iraqi leaders expressed their desire for a long-term relationship with NATO, and concurred with the critical importance of NATO's role. However, the leaders agreed that any future partnership post-2011 must be decided by the new Iraqi government.

Regarding USF-I Manning, the timely fill of Individual Augmentee positions is a critical component of our success as we transition to stability operations. In January 2010, the newly-formed USF-I reduced its personnel strength by 41% after combining 6 headquarters. As part of the responsible drawdown process, we will further reduce the USF-I headquarters by an additional 12% by 01 September. Currently, our fill rate for Individual Augmentees is 81%. Key shortages include Strategic Planners, Foreign Area Officers, Intelligence Officers, Provincial Reconstruction Team specialists and senior functional experts and advisors on the USF-I and the Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training staffs. These are key players who will plan, organize, and implement the successful transition to an enduring organization in support of our long-term partnership with the Iraqi government. We have already reduced the force to the minimum required to conduct stability operations. It is imperative that we receive and maintain 100% of our remaining operational requirement.

Our drawdown of materiel, bases and personnel in theater continues to stay on track. As of 15 July, we remain ahead of schedule, having retrograded over 37,000 pieces of rolling stock, or 93% of our goal of 40,000 pieces by 01 September. We have also retrograded over 1.2 million pieces of non-rolling stock equipment, representing 80% of our goal of 1.5 million pieces by 01 September. Most of the remaining non-rolling stock equipment will be transported back to the U.S. as part of its owning units' redeployment.

After 6 base returns and 3 base closures this week, we now occupy 112 bases – 68 of which are partnered bases. We remain on track to reach our objective of 94 bases by 01 September. Our Boots on the Ground strength currently stands at 70,955.



Very Respectfully,



Security Incidents

1 Jan 04 - 16 Jul 10
Historical Trend

24 Apr 10 - 16 Jul 10
Last 12 Weeks

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Sources: 14c [F & HN reports] as of 17 Jul 13